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PREFACE 
It was 27th December 1979, which had shaken the 
atmosphere abruptly on the global scenario. It was the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In some quarters it 
was argued that it happened on the demand of Afghan government. 
There were reactions to it - both In India and around the 
globe; it was concluded that the forces must withdraw from 
Afghanistan as soon as possible. 
India# as a regional power of South Asia, played 
its role to ease the tension of the sub-continent as she 
could not remain unconcerned with intervention, because 
Afghanistan had been India's traditional friend as a non-
aligned country. The people of India were also very sympathetic 
and sentimental towards the people of Afghanistan over this 
incident. On the other hand, predator was India's time 
tested ally. Under the debt of friendship the Government 
of India could not condemn this intervention loudly and 
openly. It was very difficult for Indian government to 
react impartially. In this difficult situation, India 
condemned Soviet intervention mildly and gave their full 
moral support to the Afghan people. What v^ as India's real 
governmental attitude towards the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, curiosly motivated me to find out the actual 
position. 
This dissertation is a library research based upon 
historical-analytical, contemplative approach and formal 
descriptive, prescriptive raei:hod. Throughout this work, 
I tried my best to use authentic data to present an objective 
analysis. Chapter one deals with India's relations with 
the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, These relations have 
their impact on total India's attitude towards the Soviet 
intervention. India could not ignore these relations in its 
attitude. In Chapter two, I tried to present Afghanistan's 
Internal political disturbances, nature of Afghan Soviet 
relations which led to Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan 
In the third chapter, efforts have been made to analyse 
few policy guidelines which influenced the whole attitude 
viz a viz to discuss the ^ndian governmental attitude 
on domestic forums on the floor of Lok Sabha and in different 
statements and interviews given by the Prime Ministers and 
other governmental officials. This whole chapter presents 
the domestic milieu towards the intervention. 
The fourth chapter unfolds the attitude adopted 
by the Indian government on different international forums 
such as the United Nations, Non-aligned Movement and in 
the Common wealth of Nations as well as international 
reaction over it. '^ he study also relies upon the scholarly 
researches, papers and contributions to newspapers. 
My debt to all of them has been acknowledged in the 
footnotes at the end of each page. Finally I am also 
indebted to Mr. Syed Salman ^iddique who typed this 
dissertation. 
1 0 t h May 1991 
( VIBHA SINGHAL ) 
CHAPTER - I 
CHAPTER - ONE 
PART ~ A 
I n d i a ' s R e l a t i o n wi th t h e SpyXet Union 
I n d i a cind S o v i e t Union a r e r egarded as t h e 
• u n f a i l i n g f r i e n d s ' . They have deve loped a s p e c i a l k ind 
of r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th each o t h e r . The I n d o - ^ o v i e t c o - o p e r a t i o n 
i s t h r e e decade o l d , t h e r e i s a h i s t o r y in c l o s e r e l a t i o n s 
1 between India and U.S.S.R. In a "Blue Book" on Ind ia 
published in 1918 by the Soviet Foreign Minis t ry , i t s Edi tor 
wrote : "There can be no general peace without a f r e e , 
independent I n d i a . . . . India w i l l , t he r e fo re , be the f i r s t 
f o r t r e s s of the Revolution on the Eastern c o n t i n e n t " . 
Russian Revolut ionar ies s ince re ly supported Indian Independence 
2 Movement by d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t means and with a l l power. 
In the period of 1917 to 1947 Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal Ganga 
Dhar '^ilak, Rabindra Nath Tagore were g ian t admirers of 
Sov ie t S o c i a l i s t system and became the champion of the 
yoxing Soviet S t a t e . The success of the Soviet experiments 
i n the f i e l d s of s o c i a l and economic develppment gave a new 
3 f i l l i p t o the ideology of the Indian National Congress . 
1 . Chandra, Prakash, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re la t ions , New Delhi , 
1983, p . 158. 
2 . From the English t r a n s l a t i o n , preserved in the National 
Archives of Ind i a , Foreign Department, s e c r e t Proceedings, 
February 1920, Nos. 258-67. 
3 . Bhatia Vinod; Indo Soviet Rela t ions ; Problem and Prospects , 
New Delhi , 1984, p . 13 . 
On this Sardar PanikH^r pointed out their views that before 
the October Revolution, Indian National Movement was totally 
liberal and exclusively political. •'•'he movement had neither 
a defined social nor an economic objective and was in that 
sense, vague and Utopian. The Russian Revolution altered 
all this .... 
For the first time Indian and ^ o^viet: delegates met 
at the San Fransisco Conference of the U.N, in April 1945. 
This was an important conference for the destiny of the world, 
Soviet delegate declared that "we have at this conference 
an Indian delegation, but India is not an Independent state. 
We all know that the time will come when the voice of an 
2 
independent Ind ia w i l l be heard, t o o . " 
The Government of India and the U.S.S.R. e s tab l i shed 
3 
d ip lomat ic r e l a t i o n s even before Ind i a became independent. 
1. Panikkar, K. M. Asia and Western Dominaijice, 
London, 1953, p . 252. 
2 . Karunakaran, K. P . , India in world Affa i r s , 
August 1947 - January 1950, C a l c u t t a , 1952, p .2 
3 . Bhatia Vinod, Indian National Congress and Sovie t 
Union, New Delh i , 1985, p . 134, 
The acid test of the Soviet friendship with India was 
of positive consequence. It was on Kashmiic issue that the 
Soviet Union used her veto in 1957 and 196? to favour 
Indian stand in the UN. As it is Kashmir had been an 
j 
in tegra l par t of India. On account of i t s s t ra teg ic 
location and geo-pol i t ics / i t continues to be the major 
bone of contention between India and Pakistan. 
The Chinese aggression on India (1962) was another 
s igni f icant issue in Indb-Soviet r e l a t ions . This episode 
did not affect the friendly re la t ions inspi te of the fact 
tha t Indian dispute was with a communist dountry. 
Signif icantly she refused to help a communist country 
against the non-communist country. Khrushchev openly 
condemned the Chinese mil i tary act ion. Again in 1965 
during Indo-Pak war, the Soviet Union helped India 
ind i rec t ly by warning China against intervention on 
behalf of Pakistan. 
* Once Nehru expressed th i s views on Kashmir (July 24, 1952); 
"which part of India, i t (Kashmir) i s in fact the heart 
of Asia I t i s also connected i n v a r i o u s ways with 
Central Asia So one has to think of Kashmir in 
tha t par t icu la r geographical posi t ion apart from other 
facts in the case" . 
(Tribune. Chandigarh, July 29, 1952). 
1, Chandra, Prakash, o p . c i t . , p . 159 
Indo Sovie t f r iendship i s well developed and i t 
became s t ronger with the passage of t i m e . There had been 
hardly an i n t e r n a l t i o n a l i ssue on which IndfLa and the 
Sovie t Union have more or less not agreed. Rather both 
had en te r ta ined i d e n t i c a l views on Goa# Korlea, Suez C r i s i s , 
West Asia and disarmament. 
Indo-Soviet economic co-opera t ion began with the 
agreement to bui ld the Bhi la i S t e e l P lan t , jsigned in 1955^ 
vvhlgh nas gone on expanding with the passage of t ime. 
In the f i e ld of s c i e n t i f i c and technologica l research , 
t h e r e has been c lose co-opera t ion between CSIR (Council 
of S c i e n t i f i c and I n d u s t r i a l Research) and jthe Sovie t Academy 
of Sc iences . 
Indo-Soviet co-opera t ion in Space research has been 
extremely f r u i t f u l as fa r as Ind ia i s concerned. The Soviet 
a s s i s t a n c e has supplemented the Indian e f f o r t s towards se l f 
r e l i a n c e and has helped acce le ra te the Indian programme 
towards achieving the na t iona l goals of using space technology 
2 for development. 
1. Rehman, A., and Qureshi, M.A., "ScienCiflc and Technological 
Re la t ions" , i n Sigh, V.B, ( e d . ) , Indo-Soviet Relat ion 
1947-77, New Delh i , 1978, p . 3 1 . 
2 . Dhawan, S a t i s h , "Co-operation in Space Research" in Sharma, 
Dr. Shankar Payal, S tudies in Indo-Soviet Co-operat ion, 
New Delhi , 1981, pp . 181-82. 
The Ranch! Engineering Heavy works, Bokaro Iron 
Works, the Thermal S t a t i on a t Hirakund, Ko)5ra# Bhakra, 
and seven other p l a c e s , the petrolevun r e f i n e r i e s a t Baroni, 
and Kayal i , the Madras Surgica l instrument factory and 
i 
Bharat Heavy E l e c t r i c a l s Limited a t Haridw^r are the l i v i n g 
monuments of Indo-Soviet economic and technological 
co -ope ra t ion . Today the Soviet Union i s our b igges t t r ade 
p a r t n e r . The t o t a l t r ade turnover with thfe Sovie t Union 
has increased from the modest f igure of Rs. 1.7 c ro res in 
1953 to Rs. 3,600 c ro res in 1982. 
Since 1963 in I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r i s a t i o n programme, 
t he Sovie t Union was not only the b igges t arms supp l i e r 
bu t a l so as a growing rupee market for Indian goods and 
t r u s t e d p o l i t i c a l a l ly to - a guaranteer of peace in the 
2 
sub-cont inen t and a custodian of Tashkent s p i r i t . 
Between 1965 t o 71 war, the Sovie t Union supplied 
1.3 b i l l i o n d o l l a r worth of arms and i n June 1980 Ind ia 
signed 1.6 b i l l i o n d o l l a r arms dea l with UiS.S.R. I n d i a ' s 
smal l but competent navy and a i r - f o r c e are l a rge ly supplied 
1 . Bhatia Vinod, Indo-Soviet Re la t ions , op. c i t . p . 151 
2 . For d e t a i l s see - Dev Sharma, Tashkent ^ Study in Foreign 
Relat ions with Document, Gandhian I n s t i t u t e of Varanasi , 
(Central Book Dept . , Allahabad),1966. 
by Sovie t equipments. India i s heavi ly dependent on them 
for nuclear energy and space-technology. 
The zeni th of Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s leached in 1971, 
i n the form of Indo-Soviet t r e a t y of Friendship and cooperat ion. ' 
This t r e a t y assured Ind ia , so l id and secure support of the 
Sovie t Union in case of any aggression aga ins t h e r . Cu l tu ra l 
r e l a t i o n s are a lso developed in the form of Indian and 
Sovie t f e s t i v a l s ce lebra ted In each o thers count ry . 
I t i s the thorough and deep f r iendly r e l a t i o n s which 
prevented India t o c r i t i c i s e c l e a r l y the ac t of m i l i t a r y 
i n t r u sion of Soviet t roops i n t o the Afghanistan t e r r i t o r y . 
Following t h e i r bas ic p o l i c i e s Indid only aqvised Sovie t 
Union for gradual withdrawl of forces s ince |she assumed the 
Sovie t s o l d i e r s entered in the Afghanistan c|n behes t of 
Afghan Government. 
! • Chandra Prakash, o p . c i t , p . 161 
2 . For de ta i l s see 
Imam Zafar* Towards a Model RelationsMp» 
New Delhi , 1983, p . 112, (Pul l t e x t of TjJeaty) 
PART .- B 
India's Relations with Afghanistan 
For centuries Afghanistan had been known as forming 
a "Cultural Province of India". India al'^ ays had very 
close and intimate ties with Afghanistan. In past( before 
1947) India had a common and long extending boundary with 
Afghanistan. With the emergence of Pakistan as a separate 
nation, both the countries (India and Afghanistan) are 
separated geographically but this physical separation 
hardly affected the traditional bonds of friendship between 
them. 
The Government of Afghanistan on several occasions 
immediately before and after independence expressed the 
2 
feelings of friendship and good-will towards India. 
On the issues of international importance affecting 
peace in the world, India and Afghanistan have continued to 
hold similar views. On Vietnam, both of them have viewed, 
with deep concern, the continuance of hostilities "as 
1. Tracing the ancient cultural ties, M. All, a noted Afghan 
Historian in an article on Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage, 
Kabul '^ 'imes, 18 April 1962. 
2. At the Asian Relations Conference held i\n New Delhi in 
March/April 1947, the Afghan delegate esipressed their 
desire in this connection, 
Asian Relations - Report of the Proceedings and Documentation 
of the First Asian Relations Conference, Asian Relations 
Organisation, New Delhi, 1948, pp. 32-33, 
a direct threat to world peace and the danger of a wider 
war". On the Hungarian issue or the Suez Crisis, their 
i 
identical views found expression at many forums even 
though they had no opportunity to discuss 
between themselves. The situation in west 
Economic Co-operation and development of bilateral relations, 
there was consultation between the two Governments, to 
these matters 
Asia, Regional 
them are members 
of Afro-Asian 
problem (between 
decide i t in c lose co-opera t ion . Both of 
of Non-aligned group of nat ions and member 
2 
group in the United Nations. On Kashmir 
India and Pakistan) and on Pakhtoon probleb, (between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan) both countries reacted sympathetically 
with each other. The leader of Pakhtoons 
Khan was close associate of Mahatma Gandhi 
Movement of India. Indian Government conferred on him their 
highest civil honour "Bharat Ratna". He is lovingly known 
as "Frontier Gandhi ** in India. With regard to trade 
3 
relations there is a Treaty of Trade and Commerce between 
the two countries. The composition of commodities in the 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
in National 
1. The Indian Express, (New Delhi) 30 January 1967 
2. Jafri, H.A.S. Indo Afghan Relations 1947-1967, New Delhi 
1976, p. 89. \ 
3. For the full Text of Treaty please see the Appendix II 
in Jafri, H.A.S., Ibid., p. 171. 
t r ade between Ind ia and Afghanistan mainly covers the 
more important indigenious products availaf^le in e i t h e r 
country for expor t s , t o the o t h e r . Ind ia a l so had been 
associa ted with Afghanistan in i t s economij= development 
Programmes in many ways. Experts were sent to work in 
d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s . Along with t h i s , therei are s t i l l so 
many f i e ld s in which India i s helping Afghanistan, A major 
show piece of Indo Afghan co-opera t ion i s an i n d u s t r i a l 
e s t a t e on the road near Kabul. I t i s supetvised by two 
Indian engineers . About f ive Indian exper ts are working 
i n the f i e ld of i r r i g a t i o n and h y d r o - e l e c t r i c i t y in 
Western Afghanistan. Several o ther Indian exper t s are 
working in Kabul i n var ious f i e ld s - f inance, a g r i c u l t u r e , 
r u r a l development, education e t c . In Kabu^ there i s a 
Kendriya Vidhyala of I n d i a ' s Cent ra l SchooiL Organiza t ion . 
Under the Government of I n d i a ' s progranime of t echn ica l and 
economic co-opera t ion with foreign c o u n t r i e s , near ly 300 
s e a t s are a l loca ted per anniim for Afghan S tuden t s . 
1. Sen, Sunanda, I n d i a ' s B i l a t e r a l Payment:^ and Trade 
Agreements, Calcut ta* 1965, p . 175. 
2 . The d e t a i l s have been taken from the Reports of Minis t ry 
of External Af fa i r s , Government of Indian New Delhi) 
for the years of 1955-56; 1958-59; l959-$0; , 1960-61, 
1961-62 and 1963-64. 
Many Afghan s tudents are stiidying i n Ind ia in d i f f e r e n t 
s u b j e c t s . There are so many o ther examples to prove the 
warin and long f r iendly r e l a t i o n s between India and Afghanistan, 
But the Russian in t e rven t ion in Afgnanistan 
became a t e s t for the f r iendship of the c o u n t r i e s . 
1. Chakrovarthy Sumit, - Date Line Kabul, New Delh i , 
1983, pp . 44-47. 
CHAPTER - I I 
CHAPTER Two 
AFGHANISTAN 
PART - (A) 
THE POLITICAL SCENE 
A f g h a n i s t a n i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y l o c a t e d b e t w e e n 
M i d d l e E a s t , C e n t r a l A s i a and t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
I t s h a r e s b o r d e r s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union i n t h e N o r t h , 
a cormtiunist c o u n t r y ; w i t h I r a n i n t h e Wes t ; an I s l a m i c 
c o u n t r y ; i n t h e S o u t h w i t h P a k i s t a n an I s l ^ i c c o u n t r y 
u n d e r s w i n g i n g i n m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p and d e m o c r a c y and 
t o t h e e x t r e m e n o r t h - w e s t w i t h C h i n a , a l s o a c o m m u n i s t 
c o u n t r y . B e f o r e t h e p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a ( 1 9 4 7 ) , A f g h a n i s t a n 
had a common and a l o n g e x t e n d i n g b o u n d r y v^fith I n d i a and t h e r e 
had a l w a y s b e e n i n t i m a t e c o n t a c t s b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s 
f rom a n c i e n t t i m e s . A f g h a n i s t a n owed i t s c o n t i n u e d s u r v i v a l 
a s an i n d e p e n d e n t p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y t o i t s l o c a t i o n a s a 
b u f f e r f i r s t b e t w e e n t h e T s a r i s t " • u s s i a n and t h e B r i t i s h 
I n d i a n e m p i r e s and l a t e r b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e 
A m e r i c a n - s p o n s o r e d m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e c a l l e d t h e Baghdad 
P a c t . ^ 
1 . J a f r i , H.A-S. Indo Afghan Rela t ions 1947-67 
New Delhi , 1976, p . 1. 
2 . Agwani, M.S. "The Sour Revolution and After" i n Misra, 
K.P. (ed.) Afghanistan in C r i s i s , New Delhi , 1981, p . l 
After the second world war, Afghanistan 
(1932-73) was ruled by King Zahir Snah. His reign 
was probably the most peaceful time in the history 
of Afghanistan and relations of the Afghanistan with 
Soviets were also cordial. His ruling per^ Lod ended in 
July 1973 with the revolution led by Sardar Mohammad Daoud, 
Zahir's cousin and brother-in-law. Mohammed Daoud was 
working as a Prime Minister in Zahir's monarchy and since 
1953 he ruled as an iron man in Afghanistan. The decade 
of Daoud witnessed some progress in the economic field 
but made no headway on the political front. In late 40's 
and early 50's King Zahir Shah had tried i[:o introduce 
elections to the people of Afghanistan. A 'liberal 
parliament' was formed in 1952 through 'relatively free' 
elections. In 1973 Daoud ousted King Zahil: Snah in a 
bloodless coup and imposed himself as head of the state. 
In his regime he abolished monarchy and made the country 
a Republic. In his power he enlisted the support of some 
groups like Khalq and Parcham (pro-Moscow),[ Shula-e-Jawed 
(Pro-Peking) and Sitam-e-Milli (Maoist) and assigned them 
administrative responsibilities in provinces. The Parcham 
group had flirted with ^aoud in mid 1970, 
1. Sengupta Bhabani t Afghanistan, Politics^ Economics 
and Society, New Delhi, 1988, p. 12. ' 
In 1977 Parcham and Khalq reunited to oppose Daoud 
under the banner of rDPA""" (People's Democtatic Party 
of Afghanistan ), a pro Soviet Party. Th^ as indirectly 
Afghanistan slipped under the communist rule. 
After the world war II Soviet Union emerged as one 
of the two Big Powers and assumed the role of the leader of 
communist block. She strengthened the hold of communism 
in the East European countries like Albania* Bulgaria, 
Hundary, Poland, Yogoslavia etc. All these countries 
have common boundries with Soviet Union. Afghanistan 
also shares borders with the Soviet Unlon^ Soviet influence 
in Afghanistan began in 1919 with Lenin's response to 
Amanullah's request for arms. In 1973 when Mohammad Daoud 
seized power in Kabul and became Prime Minlister, the Soviets 
have poured into Afghanistan more economic and military 
aid than any other external power. Soviet aid did help 
in Afghanistan's economic development but bould not bring 
about its political evolution from feudal ponarchy to a 
representative democratic polity. The two prominent Marxist 
groups had already emerged in the political life of Afghanistan, 
were Khalq and Parcham, so called after th^ publication 
2 
they spoused during the 1930s, m 1977 the Soviet Union 
Strengthened their feet in Afghanistan, 
1. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan under the Khalq" 
Problems of Communism (Washington D, c.^  
Vol. 28, July-August, 1979, pp. 37-39. 
2. Sengupta Bhabani : The Afghan Syndrome z^ How to live 
with Soviet Power, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 33-34. 
Noor Mol^ ammad Taraki , the leader of PDPA# 
endeavoured to r eun i t e p a r t y ' s s t r e n g t h . AJiother 
l eade r of PDPA* Hafizul lah Amin, l a t e r clairtied t h a t 
p r e s e n t s t reng th was enough for the period i)receding the 
Revolut ion. PDPA was an i l l e g a l p a r t y . Hafizul lah Amin 
was leader of the l e f t wing in Khalq. He w^s given the 
c r u c i a l and adventurous task of bu i ld ing pa^ty c e l l s in 
the armed forces , the po l i ce and the pa lac^ guards . 
Parcham had penet ra ted the government. Although Daoud had 
dismissed many Parcham heavyweights whom he had placed in 
s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s . They could be used foxj" v i t a l information 
by PDPA l e a d e r s . After the murder of promijnent l eade r of 
Parcham faction* Mir Akbar Khyber on 17 April 1978, Daoud 
j 
had t o face l a rge pub l ic demonstrat ions agaJ^nst him. Daoud 
was presumably shocked to d iscover the strer^gth t h a t the 
communist had acquired and he determined to crush them. 
In the next few days , Taraki , Amin, Karraal and seve ra l o ther 
l eade r s of the PDPA were a r r e s t e d . Amin was placed under 
house a r r e s t for severa l hours . No one prevented him from 
con tac t ing h i s f r i ends , and then he passed i n s t r u c t i o n s to 
p a r t y cadres in the army through h i s sons , ^ i n sen t 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t o Army and Airforce o f f i c e r s , ^sking them to act< 
1 . Misra, K.P*, o p . c i t . , p . 4 
2 . Nancy P. Newell and Richard S. Newell, 
The Struggle for Afghanistan, I thaca 1981], Ch. 4, 
He appointed colonel Aslam Watanjar as Cortutiander of 
Revolutionary Ground Forces and Colonel Abdul Qader as 
l eade r of the Revolutionary Air ^o rce . After ge t t i ng 
d e t a i l i n s t r u c t i o n s from Amin, they took t h e i r pos i t i ons 
and f i n a l l y achieved t h e i r t a r g e t , the p r e s i d e n t i a l 
pa l ace , where Daoud was e i t h e r k i l l e d by the rebels or 
2 
shot himself. 
Colonel Qader announced on Radio Afghanistan that, 
"All power has passed to the hand of masses". Three days 
later, it was announced that power was being exercised by 
a Revolutionary Council consisting of civilian as well as 
military personnel, with Taraki as the leader. The 1977 
constitution was abrogated and the Revolutionary Council 
was authorised by the PDPA Central Committee. Of the three 
top leaders, Taraki was choosen as the Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister. He was also the 
Secretary General of the Party ; Barbak Kanpal was appointed 
Vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy 
Prime Minister; and Hafizullah Amin assumed office as 
Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
1. Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan; 
The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences; 
Boulder Colorado, 1984, p. 31. 
2. Ibid. News Conference on 6 May 1978, p. 50. 
3. Sengupta, Bhabani, op.cit., p. 29. 
In h i s ea r ly pronouncements Takaki denied t h a t h i s regime 
was communist. Leaders of the new regime i n s i s t e d t h a t 
t h e i r p o l i c i e s would be based on Afghan nat ional ism, respect 
fo r Islam, economic and soc ia l j u s t i c e , non-alignment in 
fore ign a f f a i r s and respect for a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements 
2 
signed by the previous governments. The Afgi^ an revolution, 
then, was a one day affair, unlike any otheir communist 
revolution or take over in history. 
Within twenty months, the Sour revolution was brought 
to the brink of collapse. The reasons were two folds. 
By April 1979, the one-year-old PDPA regime was under seize 
from within. Before April 1979 X on March p79l in a 
dramatic reshuffle of the Cabinet and the Government, 
Amin became Prime Minister while retaining the foreign 
affairs portfolio. All the ministers in th* new cabinet were 
3 Khaliqis. At the same time, the Soviets took a more active 
and visible part in the whole government madhinery. This was 
evidently the result of the treaty of peace and friendship 
that the Soviets had signed in November 197d. The treaty 
gave the Soviets legitmicy in assisting the revolutionary 
regime to secure internal stability as well as to defend 
4 itself from external intervention or attack. 
1. Misra, K.P. , op. cit«, p. 5 
2. Sengupta Bhabani, The Afghan Syndrome, op.cit. , p. 35. 
3. Loius Dupree, The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1979 
Hanover, N.H. American Universities Field Staff Reports, (AUFS 
32, Asia, 1979 
4. Sengupta, Bhabani, op. cit, , p. 70 
The rebellion began in Nuristan, In a few weeks, 
the whole of eastern Nuristan came under the control of 
the rebels. Nuristan, located in North ''Western Afghanistan, 
has strategic importance. Thus began the first sustained 
insurgency, against the communist government in Afghanistan. 
By April 1979 Communist forces had been totally repulsed from 
eastern Nuristan; six months later most of the area was free 
of communist control. 
Noor Mohammad Taraki was close to Karmal and belonged 
to Parcham faction. There is evidence that Hafizullah Amin, 
was indulging in factional activities at that crucial juncture 
and the PDPA politburo had decided to expel him. However, 
Taraki saved him from expulsion but, later he expelled 
Karmal on Amin's instigation. Some other leaders of Parcham 
faction were also expelled from the ^evolutionary Council. 
Amin's role in these activities had enhanced his control over 
the power. This was done in March 1979, long time stay 
of Amin in power led him into collision with T^^aki. 
In July Taraki hit back by putting all armed forces under 
his cofitmand besides relieving Amin of the port-folio of 
foreign affairs which was tnen turn over to Shah Wali^-^araki 
2 however lost in final round. He was removed from office 
following a shoot out at the presidential palace on l4th 
September 1979. The story of self willed removeal was a 
wellknown narration. At that juncture Amin was invited to 
1. Sharmani, M. Nazif and Robert L. Confield (eds). 
Revolution and Rebellions in Afghanistan, Berkely,1983, pp. 
2- i:2^K^'^H^£LSkJiSl3id ^ciA:,iia&^ Zuxich 31 Juxy, 1979 
take over a Secretary General of the Party and Chairman 
of the Revolutionary Council as he was the key chairperson 
m the government. 
PART (B) 
THE INTERVENTION 
E v e n t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n t o o k an e n t i r e l y new t u r n 
on 27 December 1979 , when t h e e x i l e d Parch<tim l e a d e r 
B a b r a k Karmal r e p l a c e d Amin, f o l l o w i n g a m a s s i v e S o v i e t 
m i l i t a r y I n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h a t c o u n t r y . Th^ C e n t r a l Commi t tee 
o f PDPA and t h e D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c of A f g h a n i s t a n made 
" an i n s i s t e n t r e q u e s t t o t h e S o v i e t Union f o r i m m e d i a t e a s s i s -
t a n c e and s u p p o r t a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n " . The S o v i e t 
U n i o n d e c i d e d " t o g r a n t t h e r e q u e s t " u n d e r t h e A r t i c l e 4 
o f t h e S o v i e t Afghan T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p and C o - o p e r a t i o n 
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s i g n e d i n Moscow on 5 t h December , 1 9 7 8 • K a r m a l , h o w e v e r , 
was more s p e c i f i c . I n an i n t e r v i e w t o P a t r i o t i n F e b r u a r y 
1 9 8 0 , h e m e n t i o n e d t h a t S o v i e t t r o o p s e n t e r e d A f g h a n i s t a n 
I 
"ten days before" the overthrow of Amin. Elaborat ing the 
p o i n t he said t h a t in the second week of December 1979 an 
1. Misra, K.P. op.cit. , p. 10 
2. Petrol Alexi "On Events in Afghanistan" I^ ravda 
(Moscow), 31 December 1979. 
overwhelming majority of the PDPA central committee 
had put pressure on Amin urgently to request Soviet military 
assistance and that Amin had no choice but to accept 
the proposal to call the Soviets. 
Eventually Karmal and Moscow claime^ d that the 
Soviet forces entered Afghanistan at the ''invitation" 
of Government along with the Afghan ruling party and that 
the "invitation" was issued in order to thwart and counter 
an imminent threat to Afghanistan's independence. 
In the whole process of Sour revolution Afghanistan 
seemed to be the most unlikely candidate for a communist 
take over. And there were at least two good reasons for 
that. First, the Communist movement in Afghanistan did 
not possess the necessary means - in terms either of a 
well-oiled party machine or of a popular base - to launch 
2 
a successful revolution on its own. As it was in Eastern 
European countries at the time of Communist take over. 
For Yugoslavia and Albania there were little problem. 
1. Patriot (New Delhi) 7 February 1980. 
2. Misra, K.P. op.cit., p. 1 
In both countries the conunumst had come to dominate 
the resistance movement and in the process had destroyed 
their opponents. Both emerged firmly in the Russian Camp 
on the basis of their own efforts. 
Romania seized by the Russian in second world war. 
At that time King Michael, decorated by Stalin, to stall 
a government. Communist control of the first post meant 
the over all control of communists in working of government. 
And in 1948, Romania officially became a communist state. 
The process of comraunization of Bulgaria was 
considerably easier. The country had tradition of friendship 
with Russia ever since the Tsar had helped it, secure 
Independence from Turkey. Elections were held in Bulgaria 
in 1946 in which communist party obtained 78 % vote. 
In 1948 they crushed all opposite parties and adopted a 
Soviet style constitution. 
In Hungary, Communist leaders initiated the same 
tactics in political com^^aign, used in Romania. In February 
1947 direct Russian intervention took plac^. Under communist 
terror a new election took place in August 1947. By the 
end of 1948 their domination was complete and next year 
Hungary adopted Socialist pattern. 
The Russians shared with Poland a common border. 
The communist emphasised western reluctance to acknowledge 
in border dispute and the Russian kept refugee leaders from 
returning accept under terms imposed by the communist. 
In February 1947 the Polish Government adopted a provisional 
Soviet style constitution and by the end of 1948, all other 
parties has disappeared except the Communist Party. 
Czechoslovakia had welcomed Russian military 
success and government formed in 1945 was a coalition of 
communist social Democratic, National Socialist and leaders 
of People Party. Elections were held in 1946 in which 
communist received something of a set-back in more heavily 
Catholic Slovakia* where people objected to Czech 
centralization. Despite the events taking place in 
neighbouring countries the coalition worked, and under 
considerable pressure the Communist observed the constitution. 
As 1947 drew to a close many people still hoped that 
Czechoslovakia might serve as a bridge across the widening 
gap between Russia and the west. 
1, Robertson, International Politics since World War II; 
A Short History, New York 1966, pp. 51-55. 
In all these Eastern European countries Russians 
entered through well developed manner and through the proper 
channel (elections). In Afghanistan ther6 was no apparent 
ground for Afghanistan's Communist neighbour to encourage 
revolutionary action in that country. Due to the absence 
of communist seats inside Afghanistan, the communist 
revolution could not get air, tnus the military aggression 
was the another alternative for Soviet Union. 
To strengthen the relations with sobialist countries 
U.S.S.R, concluded different treaties of friendship and 
co-operation. U.S.S.R. signed treaty with Czechoslovakia 
(December 1943) Poland (April 1945), Romania (February 1948) 
Hungary (February 1940), Bulgaria (March 1$48) and with 
Afghanistan in 1978. 
Other major milestone in the development of Soviet 
relations with other socialist countries as well as in the 
development of the entire world socialist conununity were the 
setting up of council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1949) 
and the defensive WARSAW Treaty Organization (1955).•'" 
1. For details of all treaties please see Milestones of 
Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967 A Short History of 
CPSU. Progress Publishers Moscow. 
These friendship and co-operation treaties can 
prove the good relations of Soviet Union with socialist 
bloc. The whole intervention process was a two way process 
not single sided or dominating practices of the Soviet 
Union. Other Socialist countries had also mutually and 
actively participated in the establishment of socialist 
system in their countries. This was not forcefully imposed 
by U.S.S.R. And as about Afghanistan, the intervention of 
Soviet forces inside the country, justified under the 
Article 4 of Soviet Afghan Treaty and Article 51 of UN 
Charter. Communist take over was quite different from 
others communist revolutions. 
In Soviet Perception, the Afghan operations were 
entirely defensive, their objective was to secure a 
neighbouring firnedly state and a Marxist revolution. 
The first Soviet explaination of military intervention 
came in the columns of Pravada on 31st December 1979. 
Analyst A Patrov reporting on "An important event that have 
taken place in the life of the Afghan people in recent days", 
said that imperialist interference in Afghanistan had 
2 jeopardized "the very existence of the Republic", 
1. The provision of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
recognizes the inherent right of States for individual 
or collective self-defence. 
2. Petrov, Alexi "On Events in Afghanistan", Pravda (Moscow) 
31st December, 1979, 
AS far as concerned about Sovie t troops in Afghanistan 
Abdul Majid Sarbuland, Afghan's Minis te r of information and 
c u l t u r e express t h e i r views t h a t l imi ted cont ingent of 
the Sovie t armed forces had been c a l l e d i n t o the country 
t o "aver t a l i k e l y invasion and preclude a l l t h r e a t s of use 
of forces by i m p e r i a l i s t s headed by Washington and 
inc lud ing China. He made c l e a r t h a t the request for Soviet 
t roops was made in consonance with the Afghanistan - Soviet 
t r e a t y signed in 7th December 1978 in Moscow which had been 
subsequently r eg i s t e red with the U.N. and in accordance 
with the U.N. Char te r .^ 
Reaction on the incedence occured in Afghanistan 
dur ing the inf luence of Soviet t r oops , so many Afghan leaders 
wanted to subside the matter by the removal of forces and 
rep lac ing the weak Afghan government. In an memorandum to 
Indian Prime Minis ter Rajiv Gandhi, the Jamiet -e- Is lamic 
Afghanistan had demanded t h a t the Indian government's 
ove r t or cover t support to the puppet regime in Afghanistan 
2 
be stopped with immediate effect. 
Dr. Amin Wakeman, Secretary General of Afghan Social 
Democratic Party, had written to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
to take up with Mr. Gorbachev, the cause of the Afghan people 
1. Patriot (New Delhi) February 3, 1980. 
2. Statesman (New Delhi) July 1, 1986. 
and plead with the Soviet leaders for withdrawl of Russian 
arm forces in a short time, to create an atmosphere in which 
national and democratic elements play a crucial role in 
Afghanistan. 
Inside Afghanistan* leaders were in favour of the 
Soviet armed intervention but these leaders were pro-govern-
mental. Other leaders were anti Soviet, They opposed the 
intervention and demanded the quick withdrawl of the Soviet 
forces which was essential for democratic procedure 
in the society. 
1, Statesman, (New Delhi)« November 23# 1986. 
CHAPTER - I I I 
CHAPTER - THREE 
DOMESTIC MILIEU 
PART-A POLICY GUIDELINES 
I n d i a / u n d e r t h e I n t e r i m Government headed by Nehru , 
was t h e f i r s t c o u n t r y t o p i o n e e r n o n - a l i g n m e n t and t h e r e b y 
k e e p i n g away from Cold War p o l i t i c s of t h e G r e a t P o w e r s . 
From t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g s h e p l a y e d a p i v o t a l r o l e i n 
r a l l y i n g a number of n a t i o n s a round t h e i d e a , t o o k an a c t i v e 
p a r t a t t h e B e l g r a d e and C a i r o c o n f e r e n c e s of n o n - a l i g n e d 
n a t i o n s as a l e a d e r of ^ f r o - A s i a n g r o u p of n a t i o n s a t t h e 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , u s u a l l y t o o k an i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d and 
f e a r l e s s l y condemned o r s u p p o r t e d e i t h e r of t h e S u p e r 
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P o w e r s . 
I n d i a , c o n d e m n i n g t h e u s e , o r t h r e a t of f o r c e , 
u s u a l l y a d v o c a t e d p e a c e f u l and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s amongs t 
a l l t h e c o u n t r i e s . M u t u a l c o - o p e r a t i o n and c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
s h a l l g o t t o be t h e h a l l mark o f ' u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . 
T h i s a t t i t u d e i s c o n t a i n e d i n P a n c h s h e e l e n u m e r a t e d i n t h e 
I n d o - C h i n a t r e a t y o v e r T i b e t i n 1954 and enuncJ -^ted 
by a number of n o n - a l i g n e d and communi s t c o u n t r i e s . 
1. Jawahar Lai Nehru; I n d i a ' s Foreign Po,licy Selected 
Speeches (September 1946 to Apri l 1961), Publ ica t ion 
Div is ion , New Delhi , 1961, p . 12. 
2 . J a f r i , H.A.S. Indo-Afghan Relat ions 1947~67 
New Delhi , 1976, p . 5 1 . 
The p r i n c i p l e s are : -
1- Mutual respec t for each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y and sovere ignty , 
2- Mutual non-aggression 
3 - Mutual non- in ter ference in each o t h e r ' s 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . 
4- Equal i ty and mutual benef i t and 
5- Peaceful co -ex i s t ence . 
References of these p r i n c i p l e s were a lso made 
on many occasions during the debates in the United Nations. 
However, they formally came before the General Assembly 
i n the form of a Soviet-sponsored dec l a r a t i on concerning 
peaceful co-ex is tence only in 1957, 
Indian foreign pol icy i s commonly cha rac te r i sed 
as a pol icy of non-alignment undboubtedly, non-alignment 
i s a major plank and ca rd ina l p r i n c i p l e of I n d i a ' s foreign 
p o l i c y . I t i s a l so one of the most misunderstood concepts 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . I t i s va r ious ly described as a 
po l i cy of n e u t r a l i t y / dynamic n e u t r a l i t y , non-involvement 
and equ id i s tance , equiproximity between the super powers. 
1. United Nations General Assembly o f f i c i a l Records 
(A3637) Twelfth Session, F i r s t Committee, 935, 
Meeting (12 December 1957). 
Since i t i s a highly sub jec t ive phenomenon, i t means many 
th ings t o many people . But i t i s t o be noted t h a t non-
alignment does not denote a d o c t r i n e ; i t i s ne i t he r a creed 
nor a gospel; i t i s only an approach or a pos tu r e . 
F ina l ly i t i s an evolut ionary concept which can hardly be 
explained a t any po in t of time with any degree of f i n a l i t y , 
I t i s a pol icy of keeping away or aloof from power r i va l ry 
and m i l i t a r y engagements. 
The Afghan c r i s i s had put Indian non-alignment to 
a c r u c i a l t e s t for two reasons . In the f i r s t p l ace , 
Afghanistan i s a non-aligned s t a t e and so India cannot 
tolerQ>:e any in te re fe rence in her i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s by 
o u t s i d e r s . Secondly, the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t power being the 
Sov ie t Union the U.S. has spearheaded the opposi t ion 
which has global dimensions and thus in a way has r iv ived 
the cold war s i t u a t i o n where non-alignment automat ical ly 
2 becomes more r e l e v a n t . The Indian a t t i t u d e towards t h i s 
i n t e rven t ion on world forums, had brought down the stock 
of New Delhi as a non-aligned count ry . 
1 . Prakash Chandra; I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re la t ions ; 
New Delhi , 1983, pp. 133-134. 
2 . Ghosh Partha, "Domestic Sources of I n d i a ' s Policy of 
Non-alignment", Ind ia Quar ter ly , Indian Council of World 
Af fa i r s , July-December 1980, p . 358. 
Afghanistan, while herse l f had never been a colony 
even though she was always under the shadow of co lon ia l 
des igns , shared I n d i a ' s ac t ive i n t e r e s t in the e f f o r t s to 
e r a d i c a t e co lona i l i sm, Ind ia , had been a B r i t i s h colony and 
her a t t i t u d e towards colonial ism was rooted in her long 
s t rugg le for freedom. Thus the c lose i d e n t i t y of viev;s 
between the two count r ies and the e rad ica t ion of colonial ism 
was j u s t n a t u r a l . Jawahar Lai Nehru, the Indian Prime 
Min i s t e r , v i s i b l y i r r e t a t e d at the t a l k of 'neo-colonialism» 
and upset over i n d i r e c t references to Kashmir. In 1964, 
a t Cairo Conference Prime Minis te r Lai Bahadur S h a s t r i 
agreed t h a t " . . . . - • because of our pas t h i s to ry and our own 
freedom s t rugg le we stand unequivocally for the emancipation 
of colonies and dependent c o u n t r i e s " . At the United Nations, 
I n d i a always joined with Afghanistan and other coun t r i e s 
2 
of the region to condemn colonialism. 
India, on all occasions has been in favour of 
proclaiming the principle of self determination of the people. 
All people have the right to self determination by virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
developments. 
1- Islah (Kabul), 11 May 1963 
2- Jafri, H.A.S.. Op. Cit., pp. 53-56. 
However, India r e a l i s e d t h a t the app l ica t ion of the 
p r i n c i p l e might c r e a t e d i f f i c u l t i e s . The problem of 
m i n o r i t i e s within a country was a mat ter which was completely 
d i f f e r e n t from and which should not be confused with , 
t h a t of co lon ia l do/nination, Indian Prime Minis te r warned 
a t Cairo Conference t h a t se l f determinat ion was the r i g h t 
of any country t h a t i s dominated by another but there can 
be no se l f determinat ion for d i f f e r e n t area and regions 
wi th in a sovereign and independent count ry . For t h i s would 
lead only to separat ism and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . - f i r s t l y , 
I n d i a could not over look the bas ic p r i n c i p l e s of i t s 
foreign pol icy has to maintain r e t i cence avoiding open 
favour of condemnation of the Sovie t ac t ion . On the 
o the r hand in the l i g h t of good and f r iendly r e l a t i o n s 
v/ith Afghanistan. Ind ia could not be a mere s i l e n t 
s p e c t a t o r . Secondly, I n d i a ' s warm and fr iendly t i e s with 
Sovie t Union posed a hurdle in os t ens ib ly and c r i t i c i s i n g 
the Soviet act ion which might have affected her own 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . 
1, Conference of Head of S t a t e s and Government of 
Non-aligned c o u n t r i e s . Ministry of National 
Guidence Information, Administrat ion, Cairo (uAR) 
P. 107. 
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In maintaining the old f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with 
Afghanistan and lukewarm amicable r e l a t i o n s in a l l sphere 
of na t iona l i n t e r e s t with Soviet Union, India choose a 
common and compromising a t t i t u d e a t the time of entry of 
Sov ie t troops in Afghanistan. Ind ia pleaded t h i s incidence 
as the support of Sovie t on Afghan Government's demand, 
bu t s ince any i n t e rven t ion in any country i s not according 
t o our pol icy c o n t e n t s . India never accepted long s tay 
of foreign forces in any country there fore advised the 
Sov ie t Union t o withdraw i t s t roops g radua l ly . In t h i s 
way India accommodated witn both coun t r i e s and wor ld ' s 
genera l opinion along with United Nat ions . 
Perhaps i t would be bes t to say t h a t I n d i a ' s foreign 
po l i cy i s one of non-alignment with pov/er blocs - which 
means no p r i o r commitment to any group - coupled with a 
dynamic p a r t i c i p a t i o n in world a f f a i r s with a view to 
promoting her bas ic na t iona l i n t e r e s t of achieving a 
worthwhile s o c i a l democracy in Ind ia , and world peace and 
ac t ive and peaceful co -ex i s t ence , which, she b e l i e v e s , 
i s the basic condi t ion not only for the progress of the 
world but a lso for achieving her own basic na t iona l 
i n t e r e s t . 
1« Kundra, J . C . , Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54, Vora & 
Company Publ i shers , Bombay 1955, p . IX. 
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CHAPTSR - THREE 
PART (B) 
India's Attitude Towards The Soviet Intervention in 
Afghanistan on Domestic Forums 
In the state of turmoil and chaos, the Soviet troops 
intervened in Afghanistan to protect a marxist regime teetering 
on the edge of collapse, on 27th December 1^79. 
The Soviet Union signalled a new epoch in the world politics 
which established the Soviet Union as an emerging global 
'interventionist power'. With the intervention in 
Afghanistan, a country outside the Soviet bloc, the Soviet 
Union became another super power to intervene effectively 
in the conflict of the third world aft-'T the United 
States of America • The USA had already intervened in 
Vietnam before Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 
On 27th December 1979 the Soviet troops seized key 
buildings and all vital installations after replacing 
Amin. Babrak Karmal, new Afghan President claimed that 
Amin asked for Soviet military help "ten days before" 
2 
overthrow of Amin and Moscow acknowledged it by sending 
a limited military contingent to repel outside aggression. 
1- Sengupta Bhabani - The Afghan Syndrome, op.cit., p. 1 
2- Agwani M.i>, "The Sour Revolution and After", in Misra 
K.P. (ed) Afghanistan in Crisis, Hew Delhi, 1981, p. 11 
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promising t h a t the Soviet t roops would be withdrawn , 
when no longer needed. Pravda of 31st December ca r r i ed 
an a r t i c l e by Alexi Petrov t i t l e d "On events in Afghanistan" 
giving the Sovie t view of the recent happenings in Kabul^ 
j u s t i f y i n g the Sovie t ac t ion . Both Kabul and the Soviet 
Union claimed t h a t the i n t e rven t ion was t o t a l l y a f r iendly 
ges ture and Russian forces entered in Afghanistan on t h e i r 
very " i n v i t a t i o n " . This i s to be noted t h a t the re e x i s t s 
a t r e a t y of f r iendship and co-opera t ion . Afghanistan 
claimed t l ^ t t h e Soviet Union had granted t h i s m i l i t a r y help 
under the provis ion of Ar t i c l e 4 of the same t r e a t y and 
as well as the Ar t i c l e 51 of^U.N. Char te r . 
World came out with d i f f e r e n t views on t h i s 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . This armed i n t e rven t i on in Afghanistan shocked 
a l l the na t iona l c a p i t a l s in South Asian neighbourhood. 
Each governxiient recognised i t to be an event of the utmost 
p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i c importance for i t s own count ry . 
Pakis tan ra ised object ion on t h i s i n very open words, 
r e s t of the coun t r i e s of the region sketched problem with 
f l u i d s of t h e i r na t iona l i n t e r e s t . 
1- Ar t i c l e reproduced in - The Kabul New •'•imes, 
2nd January 1980, The paper was a r e inca rna t ion 
of the Kabul Times follov;ing the December coup. 
2- Sengupta Bhabani •- Afghanistan- P o l i t i c s Economics and 
Socie ty , op. c i t . , p . 85 . 
34 
China a major power of Asia condemned the in te rven t ion 
and four days a f t e r the i n t e r v e n t i o n , the Russian ambassador 
was ca l led to the Chinese foreign off ice to be given a 
s t rong note of p r o t e s t , I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e tov/ards t h i s 
problem was questioned and c r i t i c i s e d a t many p l aces . 
On Anerican in t e rven t ion of Vietnam, Indian c r i t i c i s m was 
bold and emphatic, on Russian in t e rven t ion in Afghanis can, 
Ind ia acted in an absolutely d i f f e r e n t manner. She did not 
c r i t i c i s e the in t e rven t ion at any p l a c e . Therefore I n d i a ' s 
a t t i t u d e remained a sharn in the l i g h t of i t s avowed policy 
of non- in te rven t ion . In case of Nicargua, the quest ion 
a r i s e s , t h a t Ind ia openly c r i t i c i s e d the American p o l i c i e s 
i n Central America, but as regard the Sovie ts in Afghanistan 
she always presented t h e i r view d ip lomat ica l ly and in vague 
terms. Surely Afghanistan i s an area of g r ea t e r i n t e r e s t 
t o India than d i s t a n t Nicargua to which India made spec i f i c 
references on i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums. 
Many reputed Indian newspapers commented on the 
i n t e rven t ion but t h e i r pro-Soviet t i l t was very apparent . 
The Indian express took a mellower view of the Soviet act ion -
"There i s no need to c r e d i t Moscow with a l l kinds of malevolent 
i n t e n s i o n s . I t i s enough t h a t they have placed tiiemselves 
1-
1- Peoples Daily, Peking, 1st January 1980. 
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in a better position to intervene in a region, where 
disaffected minorities like the Baluchis and Kurds could 
yield rich opportunities" . The elite English Press in 
India saw the problem as it was seen by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, 
Only one major daily The Hindu (Madras) gave an indepenaent 
views on the issue. It called the intervention "clear 
military intervention on the part of the Soviet Union 
against the small nation of Afghanistan .., a manifestation 
of super power bullying that threatens peace (in that it 
triggers new tensions and offer fresh precedents for 
violating the peace) as well as regional security" • 
Vfnen asked by a reporter, to comment on the intervention 
that whether India supported or opposed the intervention 
the Indian spokesman very diplomatically gave the answer. 
He replied that "we are not supporting or opposing anyone 
3 
We are still observing the situation. " 
Though India did not support the intervention 
but it reacted towards it in a very mild way. There are 
number of reasons which effected India's attitude tov;ards 
the whole issue, India and the Soviet Union were very 
1- Indian Express (New Delhi) 1st January 1930. 
2- The Hindu (Madras) 1st January 1980, 
3- The Times of India (New Delhi) 30th December 1979, 
good fr iends from the time of Nehru. After achieving the 
freedom/ India announced he rse l f a non-aligned na t ion , 
but her t i l t tov/ards Soviet Union i s well kno-,;n f ac to r . 
Both the coun t r i e s also shared t r e a t i e s of f r iendship and 
co-opera t ion . Ind ia could not a l i ena t e a country t h a t had 
stood by her a l l along, whether i t was Kashmir quest ion or 
Bangladesh war. 
Sovie t Union had a t r e a t y with Afghanistan under 
which i t has sen t troops in Afghanistan on the i n v i t a t i o n 
of Babrak Karmal. This was another reason which affects 
the Indian a t t i t u d e and which j u s t i f i e d the in t e rven t ion 
upto some e x t e n t . Another reason was t h a t in t h i s period 
Pakistan was receiving massive arms aia from America. 
So India ,Russian presence in Afghanistan was r a the r welcome, 
When in t e rven t ion took place in Afghanistan 
Janata government was in power in Ind i a . This government 
ind ica ted i t s bent towards Washington qui te of ten , 
Mr. Charan Singh conveyed I n d i a ' s deep concern at the 
2 
substantial involvement of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
1. Naiyar Kuldeep, Report on Afghanistan, New Delhi 
1981, p. 57. 
2. Bimal Prasad, "India and the Afghan Crisis" in Misra, K.P, 
(ed.) op.cit., p, 77. 
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But the attitude of Janata government towards this 
problem cannot be considered as the whole Indian 
attitude towards intervention. Because after the 
intervention this government remained in power for a 
very short period. Though the care taker Prime Minister 
Charan Singh, was critical of Russian intervention, he 
wanted to leave the matter to the New government, which 
was to ass\;ime office in the middle of January 1980. 
Again in January Mrs, Gandhi came back into the power 
and remained in power till she got assassinated and 
she dealt with the whole problem. Her stand coutinued 
to remain equivocal and mild as ever. 
The initial foreign policy action her government 
was one of clear and incisive choice. In a fresh outbreak 
of great power rivalries in South Asia, iMrs. Gandhi chose 
to remain with the Soviet Union. It was not that no other 
option was available to her, India could condemn the 
Soviet intervention. But is was necessary for India 
to remain with the Soviet Union, because India's national 
and regional interests made it for her to stay with 
tested friend. India did not support the Soviet armed 
1. Naiyar, Kuldeep, op. cit., pp. 49-50, 
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presence in Afghanistan, Indian government bel ieved 
t h a t t h i s in t e rven t ion by the Soviet Union v/as a react ion 
of Washington's moves in the Middle Eas t . Soviet intervened 
because they were worried about the developing f r iendship 
betv/een the United S ta t e s and China. 
The reac t ion of annoyance in Afghanistan and 
disappointment in most p a r t of the world made I n d i r a Gandhi 
change her s tance a l i t t l e . At her f i r s t conference 
(16th January 1980) a f t e r assuming power as i-rime Minister / 
she disapproved in te r fe rence by any foreign power in the 
a f f a i r s of another country and argued t h a t the Soviet 
Union's presence in Afghanistan had increased tens ion 
and moved danger c lo se r to the Indian borders . But once 
again she said t h a t Russia accpted only the request of the 
Afghan Revolutionary Council , Subsequently, in a debate 
i n Parliament (25th January 1980) she promised to do her 
be s t to br ing about the speedy withdrawal of Sovie t t roops . 
The Foreign Minis te r P.V. Narsimha Rao explained I n d i a ' s 
foreign pol icy towards the Afghan c r i s i s in qu i t e unambiguous 
te rms . He r e i t e r a t e d object ions to any foreign in t e r f e rence 
i n any country and expressed a hope tha t Soviet troops wi l l 
withdraw from Afghanistan as soon as p o s s i b l e . 
1. Sengupta Bhabani, The Afghan Syndrome, o p . c i t . , p . 107. 
2 . Naiyar Kuldeep, o p . c i t . , p . 60. 
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In February 1980, Soviet Foreign Minis ter A. Gromyko 
cajne to India and wanted to win I n d i a ' s support for t he i r 
ac t ion in Afghanistan. However, Ind ia explained tha t both 
the count r ies had qui te d i f f e r e n t approaches to the Afghan 
c r i s i s . The same was reechoed by India* during the re turn 
v i s i t of the Minis ter of External Affairs to Moscow in 
June 1980. I n d i a ' s apposi t ion to the presence of foreign 
troops in any country remain unchanged. Apart from i t 
I nd i a did not want to jeopardise i t s c lose f r iendly t i e s 
with the Soviet Union. 
Meanwhile Ind ia a lso took s teps t o ensure frequent 
v i s i t s and consu l t a t ions with South Asian Governments 
p a r t i c u l a r l y with Pakistan and Afghanistan with a view to 
defusing the c r i s i s and prevent ing the whole region from 
the d i r e c t involvement of super poy/ers. 
To presen t t h e i r views c l e a r l y Indian government 
dispatched diplomatic mission to a l l South Asian count r ies 
for consu l t a t ions with a view on poss ib le approaches to 
a p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement of Afghan c r i s i s . -^'here had been 
frequent v i s i t s and exchanges of view with western powers 
a l so for the same purpose i . e . t o defuse the tens ion and 
1. Misra K.P. , o p . c i t . , pp. 79-80. 
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prevent e s c a l a t i o n . In t h i s way, Indian government was 
engaged in consu l t a t ions with o ther f r iendly count r i es 
to explore now bes t the s i t u a t i o n in South West Asia can 
be resolved."'' J^resident Sanjeeva Reddy expressed his views 
in s t a t e banquet in honour of the Soviet Pres ident Brezhnev 
t h a t India wanted peace in South Asia and f r iendly r e l a t i ons 
with i t s neighbours. India remains opposed of any form of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , cover t or overt in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of 
the region. I n d i r a Gandhi expressed same type of views 
i n an interview with Washington Post . She d isc losed how 
Ainin was hated in Afghanistan because h is government had 
3 k i l l e d large number of people . 
Indian government perceived t h a t the Sovie t Union 
did not want to increase Western inf luence in South W«st 
Asia# t ha t s why they entered in Afghanistan. I r an was 
pro-west and Turkey was pro-west and China came i n t o the 
Western b l o c . In the l a s t week of January, a Sovie t analys t 
accused China of rendering s u b s t a n t i a l help to the Afghan 
1- Lok Sabha Debates, 7th s e r i e s I I I , c o l . 2 l6 . 
2- The Times (New Delhi) 9th December 1980, 
3 - An in terv iew with Washington Post on 8th December, 1980. 
Reproduced in The Times of Ind i a , (Sunday Edit ion) 
New Delhi , 9th December 1980, 
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insurgents. "The coordination of actions and practical 
collaboration between Washington and Peking had become more 
obvious in connection with the events in Afghanistan.,.. 
Chinese instructors together with U.S. military advisers are 
training Afghan rebels in special camps set up on the 
Afghan territory. Like the U.S.A./ Peking also supplies 
Afghan insurgents with armaments and other equipments". 
Soviet Union felt they were being surrounded. The situation 
in Afghanistan worsened by rebels who received full support 
from Pakistan, in these circumstances the Soviet Union 
intervened in Afghanistan. 
In a press conference in New Delhi on October 15, 
1983 Indira Gandhi reiterttted that the situation in Afghanistan 
was little different. There is a tremendous amount of 
sophisticated weaponry growing in Afghanistan against the 
government and it was unrealistic to expect the Soviets 
2 
t o withdrawal from t h e r e , 
Ind ia always saw no a l t e r n a t i v e to a negot ia ted 
p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement which would take i n t o account a l l the 
concerned p a r t i e s . India never ca l l ed the Sovie t act ion 
1- Sengupta Bhabani, - The Afghan Syndrome, op. c i t . / p . 2 1 . 
2- The Hindustan Times, (New D e l h i ) , 16 October 1983. 
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as Invasion she believed that Soviets were invited by 
the Afghan government and hence it is not an invasion, 
if a government feels it is in troubled, and it has a 
friend then she can ask to help. To prove this argument 
there are lot of examples that, it is happening in Central 
America and Africa. 
Rajiv Gandhi adhered to the policy postulates 
of Indira Gandhi. India was greatly concerned at the 
increasing militarization across the border and in entire 
Indian Ocean. This whole region is in direct contact with 
India, which is the biggest country of this region, ^he 
has an important role in any conflict of this area, because 
it will effect India's security directly. 
AS regards the solution of Afghan confli ct * 
Indian government thought that the conflict cannot be solved 
between super powers. The solution must be between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, Because India always clubbed the Soviet inter-
vention with the arms support to the insurgents of Afghanistan, 
by Pakistan. In all statements made by different 
governmental authorities, India mentioned intervention as 
*1- All these views derieved from the different interviews 
and press conference of Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi. Prime Minister Mrs. Indira ^andhi's statement 
on Foreign Policy, 1984 Ministry of External Affairs, 
External Publicity Division, New Delhi, 
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a r e s u l t of ex t e rna l i n t e r f e rence in Afghanistan. 
In t h i s connection, before any r e a l so lu t ion the re must be 
stoppage of the In te rven t ion and the in t e r f e rence without 
any p recond i t ions . 
The P a k i s t a n ' s i n t e r f e r ence and the Sovie t in te rvent ion 
in Afghanistan a lso jeopardy the s t a b i l i t y , s e c u r i t y and 
progress of the region. India stood for a p o l i t i c a l 
se t t l ement t h a t ensure sovere ignty , i n t e g r i t y , independence 
and non-aligned s t a t u s of the Afghanistan and the enables 
the refugees to r e tu rn t h e i r homes s a f e ly . Such a se t t lement 
can only come through dialogue and r e a l i s t i c concensus 
among the p a r t i e s d i r e c t l y concerned. I t i s r e a l l y a 
problem between the U.S. the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and 
Pakis tan . The so lu t ion should be acceptable t o a l l four 
of them. Rajiv Gandhi explained to the r epor te r s a t the 
Palam t h a t U.S. was not w i l l i ng t o t a lk about guarantees , 
thats to stoppage arms aid to the rebels of Afghanistan, 
2 i t i s t o be very d i f f i c u l t for the Soviets to withdraw. 
The Indian government f e l t t h a t the Sovie t s wi l l 
move out i f they provided some guarantees and these guarantees 
should work out mutually with the United s t a t e s . India 
1- Prime Minis te r Rajiv Gandhi's s tatements on Indian 
Foreign Policy - May-August, I9tt5, External Affairs 
Pub l i c i ty Div i s ion , Ministry of External Af fa i r s , New Delhi, 
2 - The Times of Ind ia , (New Delhi) 18 June 1985 
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India wanted to see Afghanistan non-aligned with no 
intervention or interference in their internal affairs. 
And India had this stand right from the beginning without 
any change. India was confident that negotiated political 
solution alone can guarantee a durable settlement of the 
existing problems of the region. 
The Indian perception turned into reality with 
the opening of Geneva talks on Afghanistan problem. 
The Geneva Accord signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
on April 14, 1988 in which the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. 
had agreed to guarantee. This accord unanimously lauded by 
world public opinion and international media. The Indian 
government approved the Geneva Accord. India herself 
played a constructive role in drafting the Geneva Package. 
The Indian President R. Venkataraman in Moscow lauded the 
Geneva Accord as a historic document providing a reasonable 
framework for return of peace to that troubled land. 
Afghanistan needs peace and non-interference from outside 
so that Afghan people can themselves resolve their internal 
issue and decided their destiny, we have to rise above 
narrow interest and artificial barriar so that countries 
1- Nair, S. V. Afghanistan ; Prospective for Reconciliation 
and Peace; New Delhi 1988, pp. 11-12. 
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of the region are left free to work out their own future 
amongst themselves without outside interference. 
The Geneva Accord stated four accords which were 
signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988 :-
(a) Between the U.S.S.R., the U.S., Pakistan and 
Afghanistan on the withdrawal of the Soviets 
forces. 
(b) Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to guarantee the 
above• 
(c) Between Pakistan and Afghanistan on non-
interference and non-intervention. 
(d) Between Afghanistan and Pakistan on return of 
2 
refugees. 
The President of the Soviet Union visited India in 
November 1988. At that time also India and Soviet Union 
expressed their support for the Geneva accord on Afghanistan, 
and call for their strict and sincere jm.ple.t.entation by 
all parties concerned. 
1- The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 7th July 1988. 
2- The Indian Express, New Delhi, 16 April 1988. 
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Ind ia and Soviet Union appealed to the U.N. 
Secre ta ry General to implement i t without delay the 
mandate given to him by the United Nations General 
Assembly. There i s a need for an i n t r a Afghan Dialogue 
for the es tabl ishment of a broad-based government. 
Speaking before a d i s t ingu i shed audience on Indo-
Sovie t i n i t i a t i v e s for peace Prof. K.K. Tewary, Minis ter 
of S t a t e for External Affairs revised the government's 
stand on Afghan i s sue t h a t Ind ia and the Soviet Union 
both neighbours of Afghanistan were not d i f f e r e n t on the 
s i t u a t i o n t h e r e . India fu l ly supported the Geneva Accord 
i f s ince re ly implemented, i t would pave the way for l a s t i n g 
peace and s t a b i l i t y in the reg ion . Both the coun t r i e s 
2 favoured a s t a b l e , neu t ra l and non-aligned Afghanistan, 
From the above mentioned statements de l ivered by the 
var ious Indian leaders from time t o t ime, i t i s very obvious 
t h a t I n d i a ' s opinion i s firm and c l e a r to the nat ions 
1- National Herald, Lucknow, 21 November , 1988 
A p a r t of the text issued on Soviet P r e s i d e n t ' s v i s i t . 
2- National Herald, Lucknow, 9 October, 1988. 
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concerned on in t e rven t ion on Afghan t e r r i t o r y by the 
Soviet t roops . There must not be any i n t e r f e r ence and 
in t e rven t ion in any country, no matter where i t i s . 
From the Geneva Accord i t seems t h a t the other nat ions 
a l so think l i k e u s . Essence of a l l governmental statements 
i s t ha t every country should be independent, sovereign and 
with the thoughts as i t s people th ink . If the people 
of Afghanistan want to l i ve with t h e i r ov^ n i d e n t i t y and 
peaceful within t h e i r capac i ty , i t i s t h e i r fundamental 
r i g h t and every nat ion should honour t h e i r r i g h t of se l f 
de te rmina t ion . Geneva Accord i s f u l l of vigour and s p i r i t , 
fo r , Afghanistan can get i t s own pos i t ion in the time to 
come. With these fee l ings Ind ia also accept the inherent 
r i g h t of s t a t e s for indiv idual or c o l l e c t i v e s e l f defense. 
I n d i a ' s response to the Afghan c r i s i s had been, 
on the whole, qu i te mature and s o p h i s t i c a t e d . I t has , 
on the one hand, been based on a sound assessment of 
I n d i a ' s own i n t e r e s t s and the p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c realut ies 
both a t the global l eve l and in the South Asian region and 
on the o ther , well ca lcu la ted t o serve the i n t e r e s t s of 
world peace as well as peace in I n d i a ' s immediate neighbour-
hood. I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e had been a guarded one. 
CHAPTER - IV 
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CHAPTER - FOUR 
INTERNATIONAL MILIEU 
PART - (A) 
India's Attitude on International Forums 
There is a world of differences between images 
and realities. In reality the United Nations is an 
association of sovereign states. It is not a world 
Government. It can act only when its member states decide 
that it should. Its action or inaction on a given situation 
reflect the collective will of its members. It is merely a 
debating forxim for international problems than anything else. 
Though it has not capability to enforce its decisions or 
resolutions. Under Article 25 of the Charter, "the Members 
of the united Nation agree to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance v/ith the present 
Charter". The lack of binding character stems from the 
idea of sovereignty that each nation entertains about its 
own self. AS far as the General Assembly is concerned, only 
a few resolutions assume legal character, as those which give 
vent to the articles of the Charter itself. The rest of the 
resolutions may assume moral force, emanating from the 
world conscience* The status of a resolution is also 
adjudged on the basis of diplomatic consensus that they 
generate. 
1. Bilgrami, S.J.R, International Organisation, III Ed. 1983, 
Appendix II, Charter of the u.N. P. 292. NevJ DELHI 
2. Ibid, pp. 60-51 
The legal atatas is assigned by Resolution No. 1514, 
dated December 14, i960 - On Granting Independence to 
Colonial countries and peoples. 
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The U. N. discussion on Afghanistan began before 
Mrs. Gandhi took over as the Prime Minister. Soviet Union 
vctoedlan American move in the Security Council to censure 
the intervention, the U.S. and its friends took the issue 
to the General Assembly, where 17 nation resolution, moved, 
asked for immediate withdrawl of all foreign troops from 
Afghanistan. The Ministry of External Affairs sought 
Mrs. Gandhi's view in statement made by Indian envoy at 
the U.N., which stunned many delegations. Indian envoy 
expressed his views mildly and said that Soviet Union assured 
India that it would withdraw its troops when Kabul asked it 
to so, Indian representative in the U.N. added that we 
have no reason to doubt the assurance, particularly from 
a friendly country like Soviet Union with whom we have 
good ties, India was also among those countries which 
2 
abstained from votxng on the U,N. resolution. 
The reaction of annoyance in Afghanistan and 
disappointment in most part of the world made Mrs. Gandhi 
change her stance a little. At her first press Conference 
(16 January 1980) after assxjming office as Prime Minister 
1- Sengupta, Bhabani, op,cit., p, 16, 
2- Nayar, Kuldeep - Report on Afghanistan New Delhi 
1981, p, 60, 
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she disapproved interference by any foreign povver in the 
affairs of another country and argued that the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan had increased tension and moved 
1 
danger closer to the Indian border. But once again she 
said that Russians entered into the Afghanistan on the 
request of Afghan ttov/rnment. She promised to do her best 
to bring about speedy withdrav/1 of the Soviet forces. 
On November 19th, 1980 Indian permanent member 
in U.N., Mr. B«C. Misra made a statement to the United 
Nation General Assembly, In which he stated that as far 
as Afghanistan is concerned India has always had close and 
friendly relations with the Government and people of Afghanistan 
and we have been deeply concerned and vitally interested 
in the security, independence sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of this traditionally friendly non-aligned 
country. 
1- The Indian Express, New Delhi l7th January 1980. 
2- Chakrovarthy, Sumit; Date line Kabul, New Delhi, 
1983, p. 99. 
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In the beainning of the year 1982 the U.N. envoy 
Mr. Diago cordenez held t a l k s with Kabul, Tehran and 
Islamabad on a poss ib le negotiated se t t l emen t , where he 
had de ta i l ed consu l t a t i ons in order fur ther to de f ine the 
subs tan t ive contents of the se t t l ement and to determine 
the procedural s teps required to give impetus t o the 
diplomat ic p rocess . The consu l t a t ions d e a l t with the four 
i tems previously inden t i f i ed for cons ide ra t ion withdrawl 
of foreign t roops , non—interference and non- in te rven t ion , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantees , and voluntary re turn of refugees. 
In Islamabad Mr. Cordonez met Pres iden t Zia-ul-Haq, 
Foreign Minis ter Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and o ther s en io r 
o f f i c i a l s . In Kabul Mr. Cordonez met Pres ident Karmal, 
P r i m e Minis ter Sul tan Ali Keshtamand and Foreign Minis te r 
Shah Dost Mohammad, In Tehran he met Foreign Min is te r 
Ali AKbar Vi l aya t i and other sen ior o f f i c i a l s . 
In 1983 Non-aligned suinmit held in IJevi De lh i . 
In which a l l coun t r i e s ca l led for withdrawl of foreign 
t r o o p s . In key note address Mrs. I n d i r a '^andhi Chairman 
of the summit explained her stand over Afghanistan, 
1- Report of the Secre ta ry General of U.N, on the 
s i t u a t i o n in Afghanistan and i t s impl ica t ions for 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . (000167) A / 3 8 / 4 4 9 . 
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Non-inteference and non intervention are basic laws 
of internat ional behaviour. But different types of 
interventions, open or covert, do take place in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. They are a l l in tolerable and 
unacceptable. No single power and group of powers has 
the jus t i f i ca t ion or moral authority to in ter fere 
or intervene. 
After the conclusion of the non-aligned suminit, 
Ind ia ' s permanent representative in United Nations sent 
a l e t t e r to Secretary General in which he expressed the 
concern of Head of the delegation about sitpuation in 
South West Asia which can endanger the paece and s t a b i l i t y 
of the region, consitutes a threat to internat ional peace 
and securi ty . In this context they viewed the s i tuat ion in 
Afghanistan with par t icular concern, "they re i tera ted 
urgent c a l l made at the 7th simunit held in New Delhi in 
March 1983 for a po l i t i c a l settlement on the basis of 
withdrawal of foreign troops and full respept for the 
independence, sovereignty, t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty and non-
aligned s ta tus of Afghanistan and s t r i c t obiservance of the 
1- 7th Non-aligned Summit Select Document, Indian Ins t i t u t e 
FOR Non-Aligned Studies, New Delhi, 1983, 
p . 194. 
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principle of non intervention and non-interference. 
In a letter dated 6th December 1983 delivered from 
permanent representative of India in General Assembly 
(united Nation) expressed same type of views of the Head 
of Government in common wealth Nations meeting held in 
2 
New Delhi from 23-29 November 1983 . They approved the 
discussion through the intermediary of the Secretairy General 
of the United Nations and expected its further continuation. 
They reaffirmed the right of Afghan refugees to return their 
homes with safety and honour. 
The Indian Government refused to condemn openly 
this intervention and accepted the rationale and justification 
given by the Soviet Union, which argued that during 1978 
and 1979 there had been overt interference from outside 
and continued armed attacks had created serious danger 
for Afghanistan, and the Afghanistan Governrtient invoking 
Article 4 of the Soviet Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Good 
1- Meeting of the Ministers and heads of the delegation 
of the NAM countries to the 38th session of UN General 
Assembly New York - 4-7 October 1983, letter dated 83.10,10 
from permanent representative of India to Secretary 
General (000245) A/38/495 . 
2- Letter dated 6 December 1983 from permanent representative 
of India to U.N, Secretary General (000078) A/38/707, 
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Neighbourliness and co-operation (1978) sought the Soviet 
military assistance to resist and threat to^  its security 
integrity and political independence. The request of 
Afghan Government for military assistance and the response 
of the Soviet Union were in accordance with the provision 
of Article 51 of the U.N, Charter which recognizes the 
inherent right of states for individual or collective 
self defence. 
The Soviet inteirvention in Afghanistan could be 
regarded as a more serious challenge to the theoretical 
framework of the United Nations security system than any 
other event in the history of the United Nations. It is 
true that it is not first act of criminality by one country 
or a super power into the affairs of another country. 
Despite this justification given by ufeSR, a resolution 
strongly deplored the recent armed intervention into 
Afghanistan as Inconsistent with a fundamental principle of 
the Charter and called for an "immediate unct>nditional and 
total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan .... " 
1- Details in Chapter One of this dissertation. 
2- General Assembly Resolution ES-6/2 of January 1980, 
paragraph 4. 
In t h i s r e so lu t ion - 104 votes were in favour and 18 votes 
were in agains t with 18 absentees . The d r a f t reso lu t ion 
sponsored by 6 Nations was mildly worded ; which avoid the 
use of the word condemnation", i n e n t i r e t e x t , the Soviet 
Union was not named. 
In i t s condemnation, Ind ia never earmarked the 
Sovie t Union d i r e c t l y . Indian government always linked 
Sovie t In t e rven t ion with the massive American arms aid to 
Pakis tan and P a k i s t a n ' s i n d i r e c t help to the rebe ls of 
Afghanistan. For Ind ia , t h i s was a lso a quest ion of the 
i n t e r e s t of peace and s t a b i l i t y in South Asian region . 
An important f ac to r of I n d i a ' s mild reac t ion was, good and 
time tes ted f r iendship with the Soviet Union, which was 
t o counter the growing American and Pakis tani l i a i s o n , 
which posed a danger to Indian s e c u r i t y . Thus i n f a c t 
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was in a way favourable 
t o I n d i a ' s t h r e a t pe rcep t ion . 
1- Saxena, K.P. "Afghanistan Conf l i c t and th^ United 
Nations", In Misra K.P. (ed.) o p . c i t . , p . 106. 
CHAPTER - FOUR 
INTERNATIONAL REACTION 
PART (B) 
The Afghan r e v o l u t i o n was d e s c r i b e d by Amer i cans 
and o t h e r s a s a c o u p , o r e v e n a p a l a c e o r an army c o u p 
r a t h e r t h a n a r e v o l u t i o n . The communi s t mdvement i n 
A f g h a n i s t a n was weak . The c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m d i d 
n o t p e r m i t t h e e x i s t e n c e of a l e g a l and open c o m m u n i s t 
p a r t y . Parcham and K h a l q were f a c t i o n s composed of u r b a n 
M a r x i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s and m i d d l e c l a s s e s , n i o s t l y c o n f i n e d 
t o K a b u l . N e i t h e r had much of a r u r a l o r e v e n p r o v i n c i a l 
b a s e b e f o r e r e v o l u t i o n . 
I t i s w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g t h a t p r i o r t o t h e S o v i e t 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , A f g h a n i s t a n had r e c e i v e d a law p r i o r i t y 
i n Amer ican s t r a t e g y . The U . S . became i n t e r e s t e d h e r e 
a f t e r i t s Ambassador (Adolph Dvibs) was k i l l e d i n F e b r u a r y 
1 9 7 9 . The o t h e r s i d e e f f e c t of S o v i e t I n t e r v e n t i o n were 
i n c r e a s e d c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y i n M a r x i s t r e g i m e and s t r e n g t h -
2 
e n i n g of t h e h a w k i s h s e n t i m e n t s i n W a s h i n g t o n , 
1- Sengupta Bhabani, op. c i t . , p . 30, 
2- Chandra Prakash, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Rela t ions , 
New Delh i , 1983, y; 247, 
'•'•'he White House Vision of the Soviet m i l i t a r y 
in t e rven t ion in Afghanistan, however was not born in 
a vacuum. The co l l apse of I r an ian monarchy in February 
1979/ was American's severes t p o l i t i c a l / s t r a t e g i c and 
economic s e t back s ince world war I I . I t was also a grea t 
lose for American's Car te r .Adminis t ra t ion , because of loss 
of one a l ly in west Asia, As a counter act ion of Soviet 
i n t e rven t ion in Afghanistan, White House i n i t i a t i v e s in 
1979 aimed simultaneously a t I ' ro tect ing v i t a l U.S. and 
Western i n t e r e s t in Gulf region, minimising losses in 
I r a n in 1979 (November - December), Car te r determined to 
increase the 1981 m i l i t a r y budget by 5 % ordered the 
s t reaml in ing of the Rapid Development Force for use in 
fu ture c r i s i s i n t h i rd world. 
Ca r t e r announced a nu^iber Of punishments. 
He suspended the s a l e of mi l l i on tonnes of U.S. gra ins to 
U.S.S.R. and a lso the advanced technology ; severe ly 
c u r t a i l e d Soviet f i sh ing p r i v i l e g e s in American water as 
well as c u l t u r a l exchange programmes ; and hinted t h a t 
U.S. might boycot t the MQSCOW Olympics, To share up 
Afghanis tan 's neighbour. Car te r sa id t ha t the United S t a t e s 
"alongwith o ther count r ies w i l l provide m i l i t a r y equipments. 
1- Sengupta Bhabani - The Afghan Syndrome, How to l i v e 
with Soviet Power, New Delh i , 1982, p . 4 , 
food and other a s s i s t ance" t o help Paikist^n defend i t s 
independence. 
' ^ e s i z e of the ' l imi t ed cont ingent" of armed forces 
and the rhe to r i c of a s se r t i ve m i l i t a r y power provoked an 
AiBerican response t h a t went far beyond Moscjow in a counter 
a s se r t i on of American m i l i t a r y might. The 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s obsession with the I ranian 
i n e v i t a b l y made i t perceive the Soviet i n t ^ 
Car te r 
s i t u a t i o n 
rvent lon as 
t h r e a t to I r a n , Pakistan and indeed the entlire mosaic of 
American and western i n t e r e s t s in the Pers i an Gulf region. 
C a r t e r described the Soviet i n t e rven t ion ir^ Afghanistan as 
the "g rea tes t t h r e a t " to peace s ince world war I I , saw i t 
as a t h r e a t t o both Iran and Pakis tan and as a "stepping 
1 
s tone t o t h e i r poss ib le con t ro l over much o!f the World's 
o i l suppl ies and a 'quantum jump in the nat|ure of Soviet 
2 behaviour" . 
To some analys ts in Washington, the Sovie t forces 
could make fu r the r moves i n t o I r an or Pakistan and commanded 
the enterance and e x i t to the Pers ian Gulf.j A tu rbu len t 
I r a n appeared to be most vulnerable to fu r ther the Soviet 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
1- The Text of the message can be found in the New York Times 
22 January 1980. 
2 - I b i d . 
3 - New York '•'•'imes, 5 January 1980, 
The uni ted S t a t e s needed a s t r i n g of f r i end ly nations 
t h a t would co-opera te in the bu i ld ing of a i^trategic consensus 
for the containment of the Soviet power and in f luence . 
The Soviet Union needed s t rong and v iable a l l i e s in s t r a t e g i c 
regions of the world in order to fend off the American 
of fens ive . The Soviet i n t e rven t i on in Afghc^nistan helped the 
U.S. to mobilize a large number of Third world nations to 
condemn deplore or r eg re t the Kremlin 's act ion at the 
world Islamic Conference and a t the United Nation. 
The west European percept ions of the Sovie t armed 
in t e rven t ion in Afghanistan did not mirror those of the 
United S t a t e s . Each West European governnient condemned the 
Sovie t ac t ion , was outraged by i t , but none except the Tory 
regime of Great Br i t a in believeu t h a t r e c a l l of the cold 
war, economic sanct ions and boycot t of the Moscow Olympics 
2 
were the r i gh t response. S t r a t e g i c exper ts were divided 
on the defens ive , offensive percept ion of the Sovie t 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . The smaller coun t r i e s were watching the bigger 
ones uneas i ly . Whether from wishful th ink ing , experience or 
s agac i t y , America's par tners were not ready to take i t for 
1- Sengupta Bhabani : Afghanistan -» P o l i t i c s , Economics 
and Soc ie ty , New Delhi , 1988, p . 9 1 , 
2 - New York Times, 6th January 1980, The Hindu, (Madras) 
2 February, 1980. 
granted t h a t de ten te was died and t h a t therje was no choice 
but to hunker down for cold war. 
Four days a f t e r the Sovie t i n t e rven t ion in Afghanistan 
the Russian ambassador was c a l l e d t o the Chinese foreign 
of f ice to be given a s t rong note of protes t | . Peking also 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soyie t t roops , 
"Afghanistan i s China 's neighbour and the re fore the Soviet 
armed invasion of t h a t country poses a t h r e k t t o China 's 
s ecu r i t y " / the Chinese note s a i d . "This can not but 
2 
arouse the grave concern of the Chinese people . 
The Chinese communist newspaper in Hciingkong, 
Ta Kung Pao, expected the Sovie t Union to "Eventually 
carve out a separa te Baluchistan as one of i|ts s a t e l l i t e s 
3 in South Asia ." 
Pakis tan was the country where impact of the Soviet 
m i l i t a r y movement i n t o Afghanistan produced the l a r g e s t 
4 
trauma and the deepest p e r p l e x i t i e s . 
1- New York Times, 13th June 1980-
2 - Peoples Daily^ (Peking), 1s t January 19bu. 
3 - Ta Kung PaO/ Hong Kong, 3rd January, 1980. 
4 - Sengupta Bhabani, The Afghan Syndrome, Op. c i t . , p . 18, 
The s o c i a l and economic reforms intrpduced by 
i 
the revolut ionary regime had provoked powerful vested 
i n t e r e s t s within Afghanistan, These intere:pts p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the feudal i n t e r e s t s , which were c lose ly associated with 
mullahs, rose in revo l t s agains t the Govermtient headed by 
Taraki . Continuously persecuted by government forces , 
the rebels s t a r t e d cross ing over to Pakistan as refugees. 
The r i g h t wing p a r t i e s in Pakis tan , which wetre c lose ly 
co l l abo ra t i ng the then Mart ia l Law regime iri Pak i t t an , 
s t a r t e d supplying mate r ia l and moral support^ to them. 
Along with t h i s , there were a l so Baluch and Pakhtun problems. 
Afghanistan i n s i s t e d Pak to solve these problems in the 
l i g h t of h i s t o r i c f.-cts of t h i s region. But m i l i t a r y regime 
i n Pakistan turned deaf the i n t e n s i t y of thefee problems. 
On t h i s i s sue both the count r i es have t h e i r own and d i f f e r e n t 
views. The Afghan Government was a l so not aj/are of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Afghan rebels on Pakis tan i t e r r i t o r y . 
La te r , these rebe ls t o t a l l y con t ro l l ed the Afghan province, 
Nur i s t an . Nearly hal f a mi l l i on Afghans had taken refuge 
i n Pakistan s ince the revolut ion of April 191^ 8 ; thousands 
of them were ac t i ve ly angaged in an armed ins|urgency against 
1- Ahmed F i roz , Inq i l ab Afghanistan (Karachi) |, 1979, p . 57, 
2 - The Dawn (Karachi) 21 November, 1978 on the v i s i t of 
Gen. Zia-ul-Haq to the Kabul, 
pro-Soviet regime. Pakistan was t r a i n i n g an4 arming a large 
nxomber of insurgents and permit ted o ther poUers, notd^ly 
United S t a t e s , China, and Egypt, to feed th4 rebe ls with 
i 
arms and amunitions had been common knowledge. 
Notwithstanding, o ther i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments 
on account of super power r i v a l r y l i k e the inc reas ing 
concent ra t ion of American naval forces i n Ir^dian Ocean, 
or around Diago Garcia, the f a l l of the Shal-^  of Iran^ 
aggravated tens ions i n South //est Asia. Thct U.S. c rea ted 
a force ca l l ed the Rapid Deployment Forces j:or ac t ion in 
Gulf area s p e c i a l l y in Afghanistan as well as in any other 
country in the region where an t i -U .S . elements might be 
3 
founding to topple a ru l ing regime. The Chinese were 
co-ord ina t ing t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s with those oi: U.S. in the 
reg ion . Light arms were being supplied to the rebe l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
1 . Indian Express, (New Delhi) 10 December 1979. 
2 - For d e t a i l s see Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean, 
a s t r a t e g i c Dimension 1983, Vikas, NewD<plhi, pp. 67-84, 
3 - Kalim Bahadur, "Pakis tan ' s Policy Towards Afghanistan" 
in Misra K.P Op. c i t . , p . 96, 
4 - The Hindu (Madras), 28 May 1979, 
The t r i n i t y of PaH-United S t a t e s and China-
s t r a t e g i c a l l y cons t i t u t ed t r i p p l e t h r e a t to Afghans 
independence. I t was l ikewise imperat ive for the Soviet 
Union to p r o t e c t the pro-Soviet Kabul regimfe. For i t s 
own secu r i t y t h r e a t percept ion , the Soviet ^Jnion apprehended 
t h e i r i n t e rven t ion in Afghanistan, hence thb Sovie t 
i n t e r v e n t i o n and i t s i n e v i t a b i l i t y to them. 
Pak i s t an ' s government f i r s t o f f i c i a l r eac t ion to 
the Soviet ac t ion in Afghanistan was somewhat cau t i ons . 
In a statement issued on December 29, i t expressed i t s 
"graves t concern" a t the Soviet i n t e r v e n t i o ^ , " a l l the more" 
because the vict im was an Is lamic na t ion . Pakistan saw 
the act ion as "par t of a grand Sovie t desigb to e s t a b l i s h 
hegemony in South Asia", and regarded i t asj a " d i r e c t 
t h r e a t to the s ecu r i t y of Pakis tan , I ran anjd o ther 
neighbouring c o u n t r i e s " . 
I 
Khan Abdul ^^haffar Khan a prominent t^akhtoon personality 
I 
who lived in s e l f ex i l e in Jalalabad expressed t h e i r views 
on the Soviet i n t e rven t ion i n Afghanistan, [that the re was 
a ca t a s t roph ic s i t u a t i o n developing in the reg ion . He 
blamed t h a t Americans and the B r i t i s h e r s foir t h e i r mechanisatii 
1- Times of Ind i a , (New Delhi) 3 January 1900. 
in the region, he hoped that India must intervene on 
behalf of the forces sanity", if a war breaks out in 
Afghanistan, every one will be destroyed; Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and even Hindustan. 
After the military intervention in Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan brought the world on the threshhold of a 
new U.S. - Soviet confrontation. Each countiry reacted 
on this issue in the context of their own national, 
interest. Likewise Indian government attitude on this issue 
was influenced by their own national interest i.e. the 
good relationship with Soviet Union and Afghanistan 
as well as a corollary to her foreign policy principles. 
1- Statesman, (New Delhi) 20 January 1980 
CONCLUSION 
CONCLUSION 
In the midst of epoch-making relevance of sense 
of peace, non-alignment/ mutual understanding, friendship 
and practice of non-interference into the other country's 
affair, and the increasing import of the principle of 
self determination ; the Soviet forces tried to revise old 
practice of communist expansion in the form of an intrusion 
in the Afghan soil. This issue had alarmed the nations 
whose efforts in establishing peace were in process. It was 
bolt from the blue to the approaches enhancing peace zones 
and mutual co-operation making phenomenon. Though in 
Afghanistan the internal conditions were not very opportune 
because of weak government. The use of military intervention 
was notified by Soviet ambassador in India. 
1. Mr. Vornotsov in December 1979 handed a message to the then 
Foreign Secretary Mr. Ram Sathe from the Soviet government, 
informing the Indian government "at the request of Afghan 
government, Moscow had sent to Afghanistan a Limited 
contingent military force to enable Kabul toresist external 
eggression and interference. It was interm of Soviet Afghan 
treaty of friendship as well as article 51 of UN Charter 
providing for individual or collective self defence in the 
case of external arms attack", 
Sengupta Bhabani, The Afghan Syndrome, New Delhi,1982, p. 13. 
It was assiimed that the armed and moral support 
were being given by the neighbouring country Pakistan to 
the rebels in the Afghanistan, These rebels were supposed 
to be responsible for the internal crisis and the government 
was finding itself incapable to check them, and feared 
aggression from Pakistan if situation suited her. As a 
precautionary measure Afghan government demanded military 
assistance to check this threat. Diplomatically Pakistan 
saw a good chance which may be avail ed for more and more 
military aid from America, showing that the country was in 
peril due to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. 
India saw a big scope of military and political 
activity on the horizon of South west region of Asia. 
The clouds of war may effect the neighbours * India had 
a great concern of it and pleaded that there must not be 
any military action which could disturb the progress and 
prosperity of nations like Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
She established diplomatic connections with the concerned 
countries and tried her best to mobilize this issue for 
normalization. She demanded the withdrawl of the Soviet 
troops and warned Pakistan not to indulge in unwanted 
activities, for, any further military aid to Pakistan, 
India did not see any genuine reason for it and those 
weapons granted for Pakistan might be used against I n d i a . 
The United S t a t e s was also made aware such Indian apprehension. 
Although I n d i a ' s stand on Afghanistan has o s c i l l a t e d between 
s t rong support and censure , i t was c l e a r t o world t h a t Indian 
Premier had c a s t a l o t with the S o v i e t s , time t e s t ed and 
durable a l l y . The i n b u i l t cons tant of I n d i a ' s foreign 
po l icy prevented her from openly d e f i l i n g Russians. 
I n d i a ' s pol icy options on in te rven t ions by the 
U.S.A. had been unambiguous however by making a c l e a r and 
f i n a l choice to s ide with the ^"^ussians, India had made 
an immediate con t r ibu t ion to the s t a b i l i t y of the reg ion . 
Any ambiguity on I n d i a ' s p a r t would have had s e r ious ly 
jeopardised the s t r a t i g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p with the S o v i e t s , 
the absence of which might have affected d iv iden t s in fu tu re . 
In no conceivable circumstances could India l i n e up with 
Pak is tan , China and the US agains t the Soviet Union, which 
would undermine t h i s c r u c i a l gain of Indian Foreign Policy 
s ince independence. Any measured censure of the Sovie t 
ac t ion in Afghanistan could only have l o s t India a valued 
and t rus t ed f r i ensh ip without compansation from any o ther 
q u a r t e r . I s o l a t i o n would have increased Soviet i n t r ans igence ; 
I nd i a would have no other occasion to impress Moscow's 
t h ink ing and ac t ion as a f r iend . 
This i s p rec i se ly what e s t ab l i shed I n d i a ' s 
foreign pol icy while the r e s t of the world was reviev/ing 
the Soviet move in Afghanistan as a global c o n f l i e c t . 
I n d i a ' s only i n t e r e s t in Afghanistan 's chess garrie was 
t o n e u t r a l i s e Pak i s t an ' s m i l i t a r y ambitions on I n d i a ' s 
b o r d e r . 
Soviet i n t e rven t ion in Afghanistan and apparant 
he lp lessness of the west in g e t t i n g the Soviets out/ 
have profound consequences for Super Pov/ers r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n general and for the count r ies of South Asian region in 
p a r t i c u l a r . In specif ic terms i t would mean convergence 
of i n t e r e s t between the U.S. and China in checkmating 
the Soviet Union and m i l i t a r y co-opera t ion between Pakistan 
and the U.S. for the same purpose. The m i l i t a r y preparedn ess 
of Pakistan would be modernised and s t rengthened. Ind ia 
w i l l have preforced in increase the defence expenditure 
by going in for soph i s t i ca t ed weaponry. The Soviet act ion 
in Afghanistan was being seen as a s i n i s t e r attempt on the 
U.S. pa r t to extend sphere of inf luence up to I ran and 
Pakis tan or may i t be a pa r t of i t s expans ionis t at tempt 
l i k e in East-Europe. 
Even and a f t e r soiie years there was no s ign of 
withdrawcii the bas i s of i n t e rven t ion condemnation was the 
p l i g h t over 1.5 mi l l ion Afghan refugees in Pakistan had 
had aroused international concern as wellx as sympathy 
probably. Russian inarched their troops under some kind of 
panic and had thereby bitten off more than they could chew . 
Any way, she was in no mood to pack and vacate and v/anted 
the survival of Karmal government at any cost. The Soviet 
condition of withdrawal* as announced, was credible guarantee 
against continuance and repetition of circumstances which 
compelled her to intervene. In others opinion its solution 
may be political rather than military action in such a way 
that the condition of Pakistan can be neutralised but at 
this stage it was bitter pill to swallow. 
United States reacted sharply on this act of 
intervention of Soviets in Afghanistan in so many ways. 
U.S. showed her anger as Carter announced the establishment 
of "Rapid Deployment Force" and strengthening of naval 
forces in Indian Ocean and decided to secure basis in Kenya, 
Egypt and Somalia, extended aid to Pakistan and staged regular 
flights of B-52 in the Gulf Region. 
The most recisive US response to the Soviets consisted 
in three line of policies - massive economic and military 
aid to Pakistan greatly enhanced the naval presence in 
Indian ocean and the Persian Gulf ^— playing the China 
c ard, 
1- Chadda Maya, "Super Power rivalry in South West Asia : 
The Afghan Crisis 1979", India Quarterly, New Delhi, 
1981, . p. 5O1. 
The visit of Afghan leader Najibullah to New Delhi 
on the invitation of Indian Prime Minister had been severely-
criticised by U.S. officials of Reagan administration and 
termed it as "unfortunate". This criticism of the U.S. 
either on military intervention or any act of India in 
this matter which strengthen the friendly terms with 
Afghanistan or Soviets, clearly a reaction shown by any 
rival. The main of the U.S. is to oppose any military 
power disbalance or additional influence of the Soviets 
on the international region. 
India has traditional friendly relations with 
Afghanistan and much in common with that country from the 
historical and traditional angles. Undoubtedly the Geneva 
Accord will have a generally beneficial impact on the rest 
of the vast South Asian region, to as such the significance 
of the accords goes for beyond the confines of the region. 
Speaking in a Seminar on Geneva agreements of Afghanistan 
then minister of Defence K. C. Pant welcomed Afghanistan 
to the Non-aligned movement and the Association for South 
Asian regional co-operation. He also admitted that million 
of Afghan people went into exile due to the intervention 
and India will provide assistance for the relief and 
1- The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 7, 1988. 
and rehabilitation of the Afghan refugees. 
The implimentation of Geneva Accord will lead to 
reduction of tensions in this region and remove all 
justification often cited by western powers, for the 
induction of sophisticated v/eapons and equipments into 
the region. 
The crisis of Afghanistan had been continuing for 
nine years. Perhaps it would be too optimistic to expect 
it, to be resolved shortly. In 1989, the Soviet troops were 
withdrawn, following the Geneva Accord. The duration of the 
stay of forces was nearly 10 or 11 years in which the 
countries concern spoke and pleaded in their own way and 
acted within thier interests, though the general opinion 
of the world was against the intrusion and favoured an 
immediate withdrawl of the Soviet. So to say, forces should 
have shifted after a year, or so, and however, Russians 
agreed to do the same but only when the internal conditions 
of Afghanistan and mode of aggression of Pakistan will 
subside In a suitable manner. It is amazing that this 
1- Article based on the inaugural speech of the Union 
Minister of Defence, at the Seminar on Geneva Agreement 
of Afghanistan and its implimentation a critical estimate, 
24 September, 1988, 
Chopra, V. D. - Geneva Accord - Boost to Peace; 
New Delhi, 1988, pp. 19-23. 
could be possible after so much time, while the conditions 
are not so much improved as they were thought to be. 
The rebels of Afghanistan played a main role to resist the 
Soviet forces and continuously opposed their activities on 
the Afghan land. They fought with the sophisticated weapons 
and they proved worthy in the guirilla war. Mow again the 
question arises how these rebels got these modern weapons 
and the techniques of war, they used in fighting against the 
Soviet troops. Obviously, it was externally aided which might 
be provided from the U.S-A. or China through Pakistan. 
The Soviet argued for their stay in Afthanistan because of 
this foreign aid to Afghan rebels and they could stay there 
upon its behalf and Geneva Accord was the result of this 
conflict between the Super Powers, 
In general/ the same Tu,pe of politics which rounds 
along the power and it was played on the grounds of weaker, 
undeveloped and small countries. The countries of the '-'^hird 
world have been the victims of this tangle. Though the non-
al>t.gned attitude has a sufficient weight among the developing 
countries or in the third world because they hope it is the 
most befitting solution and it may make them safer. 
the main t ene t s of I n d i a n ' s foreign pol icy were -
f a i t h in U.N., non-alignment/ an t i -co lon ia l i sm and se l f 
de te rmina t ion . I t had a very important move in para l led 
t o the sense of peace making idea and smooth running tov;ards 
the progress and p r o s p e r i t y . I t was the s i f v e r l i n e among 
the sable clouds which may pave the way of sovereign 
independent and in te r fe rence free na t i ons . This idea to 
be non-aligned in the "mili tary pacts with the Super Powers 
gave r e l i e f to those count r ies which were not in t h i s favour 
of pact ism. They followed the s u i t and the t h i r d world 
i s generated/ i t i s a world of under-developed c o u n t r i e s , 
SAARC i s a lso a f r u i t of t h i s p l a n t . 
The continuous p o l i t i c a l pressure of the coun t r i es 
and a thrash given by Afghan rebe ls caused Sovie t withdrawal/ 
Geneva Accord i s s t r i c t l y based on t h i s idea (which to be 
powers had to comrr.it.) 
Though the p o l i t i c a l condi t ions ins ide Afghanistan, 
a f t e r the removal of the Sovie t t roops are not very c l e a r 
because of the anguish and anger in the masses aga ins t the 
government s t r u c t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s of Afghan rebe l s are 
s t i l l in s i g h t . But i t i s I n d i a ' s ea rnes t d e s i r e and hope 
t h a t i t w i l l regain her sovereign s t a t u s as a non-aligned 
and secu la r country/ which would make a peaceful zone in the 
South West and South Asian reg ion . 
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